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In 1993 federal elections were held in Australia and
Canada alike. Whereas a complacent Australian media
framed their coverage of the 1993 campaign in ways
which cast voters in the role of passive consumers of
politics, the Canadian news media experimented with
various inclusive strategies which were intended to in-
stall ordinary Canadians at the very centre of their elec-
tion coverage. The most publicised of these laudable
experiments involved a series of television town hall
meetings carried by the CBC’s Prime Time news pro-
gram. The Canadian media’s innovative coverage
demonstrates that it is possible to approach elections
as something more than a contest between leaders and
parties, and to see campaigns as a public discourse in
which ordinary voters can be given a voice. It is in this
sense that the media coverage of the 1993 Canadian
election offers Australian news and current affairs
journalists a model for a fresh, more inclusive and
democratic approach to reporting election campaigns
in this country.
EVEN although David Sless (1993, p.61) finds “nothingnew” in their treatment of the campaign, it is not entirelytrue that the news media approached the 1993 Australian
election as business-as-usual. After all, this was the campaign in
which Channel 9 unveiled a “worm” which see-sawed its way
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across TV screens to reveal the immediate reactions of a studio
group of uncommitted voters to the points which the Prime Min-
ister and Opposition leader made during their formal debate en-
counters. It was also the campaign when the Nine Sunday
program ventured to give Labor’s Senator Graham Richardson
and the Liberals’ John Howard a weekly spot, ostensibly to ana-
lyse their foes’ unfolding campaigns, and in practice to press
their party lines. However, like the worm, this innovation added
little. For the most part news and current affairs coverage of the
campaign, even where news organisations opted to keep a re-
spectable distance from the parties’ determined efforts to mould
the news, amounted to more of the same. It is therefore not sur-
prising, after examining the television news and current affairs
coverage of the 1993 election, that Bell and Boehringer (1993,
p.12) should suggest that there appears to have been “a consoli-
dation and extension of the processes” which they first observed
13 years before in their study of media coverage of the 1980 elec-
tion.
Of course, it is Bell and Boehringer’s thesis that, on the one
hand, television news and current affairs alike paint policy is-
sues as highly complex and decipherable only via the on-screen
interventions of reporters and “expert” commentators such as
economists. On the other hand, the news emphasises the ad-
versarial nature of politics. In each of these ways television con-
structs politics as a “charade” against which it can “define its
own legitimacy in contrast”. Television news and current affairs
treat elections as spectacles of entertainment, as dramatic battles
between parties and their leaders. In so doing television removes
citizens from the contest, and in catching them up in the drama
of the campaign, robs them of the capacity to decide or even re-
flect on the policy issues at stake. The kernel of Bell and
Boehringer’s thesis is that television treats its viewers as passive
spectators, indeed “as consumers of party politics” (Bell and
Boehringer 1993, p.12). In essence, the complaint is that the tele-
vision coverage of election contests leaves voters out of the pic-
ture. However, much the same argument might be made about
the manner in which radio and the press report elections. These
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news media also mostly treat elections as contests between lead-
ers and parties rather than as opportunities for citizens to flag is-
sues of concern to them.
It is noteworthy that during the 1993 election it was the Lib-
eral Party and not the news media which attempted to push or-
dinary Australians to the centre-stage. The high point of the
Liberals’ February 24 official campaign launch was the introduc-
tion of a series of “ordinary” Australians whom the then Opposi-
tion Leader, Dr Hewson, introduced as “victims” of his
opponents’ policies. Of course, Liberal strategists were not going
to allow ordinary Australians to hijack their campaign agenda.
Rather, they wanted to put a human face on the otherwise dry,
economically focused Fightback! policy package. Those citizens
introduced by Hewson as “victims” of 10 years of Labor neglect
had each been carefully selected. Their appearance at the Liberal
rally was carefully orchestrated with the wider television audi-
ence in mind. And as a campaign ploy it probably failed. Jour-
nalists and commentators attacked it as a contrived stunt, and
even declared that “ordinary” Australians looked out of place in
an otherwise slick television production which resembled an ex-
tended political commercial. The Telegraph Mirror‘s senior politi-
cal reporter at the time, Amanda Buckley, wrote that their
“authenticity” rendered them “out of place at what started off as
a glitzy artificial Liberal launch” (see Hirst 1993, p.38).
The tenor of responses such as Buckley’s, and the immediate
media scramble to vet the credentials of the five “ordinary” citi-
zens paraded by the Liberals, suggests an underlying assump-
tion among journalists and editors is that ordinary voters
actually have no place on centre-stage in an election campaign.
In this context it is noteworthy that David Sless (1993, p.61) ar-
gues that the very reason that election campaigns have become
so boring is because the media (and parties) have progressively
excluded citizens from the electoral process. Sless (1993, p.61)
himself berates the media for its boring news coverage of the
1993 federal election and willingness to endlessly regurgitate
“the same old election cliches”. But he also identifies as a prob-
lem the similar willingness of communication researchers to con-
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tinually recycle their well-worn criticisms of political
communication! It is time, he suggests, to look at “alternative
structures and modes of communication” (Sless 1993, p.66). If we
take his provocation seriously, then we need do more than com-
plain that the news coverage of federal elections reworks the
same tired themes, or that it effectively marginalises voters. In-
stead we need turn our attention to modes of communication —
to journalistic practices — which might bring the voters back in.
An alternative, Canadian model
In 1993 a federal election was also held in Canada. In report-
ing that election the mainstream Canadian media adopted a
number of sometimes quite innovative strategies designed to put
ordinary Canadians at the centre of the campaign coverage.
These ranged from establishing panels of voters to regularly
comment on the campaign in print and on radio, through to tele-
vising a series of town hall meetings in which voters were able to
extensively question prominent politicians. It is true that these
efforts did not displace more conventional media coverage of the
activities and pronouncements of party leaders which nowadays
in Canada (as in Australia) is the stuff from which much election
news is fashioned. Nor were all the different strategies for bring-
ing voters back into the campaign story equally successful.
Nonetheless, initiatives such as televised town hall meetings did
take media coverage of the 1993 Canadian election a consider-
able step beyond “disdaining the news” (Blumler 1990, p.108) by
occasionally writing about and laying bare the parties’ various
efforts to “stage manage” the news (which thus far has been the
chief response of Australian editors and reporters to the deter-
mined efforts of political strategists to control the campaign
agenda). In this paper I argue that despite their flaws, these Ca-
nadian experiments with citizen-centred forms of election cover-
age constitute an example of “international best practice” to
which Australian editors and journalists might usefully look for
an alternative model.
No doubt the efforts which the Canadian media made in 1993
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to bring the voter back into their campaign coverage were en-
couraged by the “increased participation from citizens through
town hall meetings, call-ins, and interactive technology” (Kenner
Muir 1994, p.227) which had been a feature of the 1992 US presi-
dential campaign. But they must also be set in a distinctly Cana-
dian context, against both the background of the previous 1988
Canadian election and against the 1991 report of the (Lortie)
Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing.
The 1988 Canadian campaign has been described as an especially
dramatic, divisive election (Levine 1993, p.344). It was also a
campaign which on the one hand demonstrated “the awesome
power of television to control an election agenda”, and, on the
other, that the ruling Tory party and its leader had perfected the
art of evading scrutiny and steering the news by supplying the
sound bites and visuals required by television (Levine 1993,
p.350). Against this background it is not surprising that Lortie
and his co-commissioners found that “[i]n recent years, there has
been considerable criticism of news coverage of election cam-
paigns” (RCERPF 1991, p.471).
A common complaint about media coverage of the 1988 and
other recent Canadian elections is that it has been superficial.
Lortie heard arguments that “[c]overage in the mainstream me-
dia presents a limited range of perspectives, focuses on the lead-
ers of the larger parties at the expense of local candidates and
other spokespeople and often fails to put campaign events in
context” (RCERPF 1991, p.472). Perhaps not surprisingly in view
of the assiduous efforts of political parties and others to shape
the ways in which elections are reported, the Royal Commission
concluded that the news media alone were not responsible for
the “weaknesses of news coverage of Canadian election cam-
paigns”. After all, the parties, their pollsters and campaign strat-
egists also had a hand in deciding the issue content and form of
presentation of campaign news (RCERPF 1991, p.479).
In casting about for a practical solution, Lortie turned to the
example of the conference of party strategists, journalists and
media scholars which the CBC and Queen’s University had con-
vened in the wake of the 1988 election to review the Canadian
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news media’s coverage of that campaign and its evident short-
comings. Indeed, the Royal Commission formally recommended
that bodies such as the Canadian Journalism Foundation run
regular seminars on campaign coverage; and that the Canadian
Association of Journalists should continue, and that other media
organisations should initiate, the practice of holding post-elec-
tion evaluations of the media’s campaign coverage (RCERPF
1991, p.480). The various initiatives taken by the Canadian news
media in an effort to inject the views of ordinary Canadians into
the coverage of the 1993 election, and to prevent the parties and
their “spin doctors” from controlling the media agenda during
the campaign, appear to owe much to an industry consultation
process of the kind prescribed by Lortie and his fellow Commis-
sioners. For example, in anticipation of the 1993 election the Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Corporation convened several in-house
conferences in which its producers consulted media scholars and
other outsiders, and from which its eventual decision to conduct
a series of television town halls was born.
Television town halls and other inclusive
strategies
Of course, in North America the town hall meeting is a tradi-
tional symbol of democracy. During 1992 the idea that town hall
meetings might be revived and reinvigorated by modern com-
munication technology had been popularised by J. Ross Perot
and the publicity given to his quixotic campaign for the US presi-
dency. In Canada the CBC, whose brief as the national broad-
caster is to “present the widest possible range of ideas” (Taras
1990, p.7), decided that its coverage of the 1993 federal campaign
would include a weekly series of four nationally televised elec-
tion town halls. These were conceived of as an opportunity for
small groups of about 50 ordinary Canadians (who had been
carefully selected by a market research company) to enter into a
dialogue with a panel of politicians representing each of the ma-
jor parties and various of their rivals. These panels typically
comprised influential frontbenchers and other prominent politi-
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cians (rather than the Prime Minister or Opposition leader, who
obtain extensive media coverage in the normal course of events).
Each election town hall was broadcast in conjunction with — and
in the extended timeslot of — the CBC’s Prime Time mid-evening
news program. The first (broadcast on Monday October 18) took
up the issue of the accountability of politicians and the break-
down of public faith in the Canadian political system. Subse-
quent Monday night town halls canvassed identifiable election
issues such as employment and the economy.
CBC’s election town halls attracted considerable publicity. But
they were in fact just one device used by the news media to inject
the voices of ordinary Canadians into the election. Recent Cana-
dian elections have seen the institutionalisation of televised de-
bates (in French and English) between rival party leaders. For the
1993 English language debate a market research firm assembled
an audience of 86 voters representing “a microcosm of Canadian
demographics, geography, income, marital status, family com-
position and so on” (Lee 1993). In a novel twist, at least for Can-
ada, the participating leaders were asked to field questions from
this audience of voters as well as from a panel of journalists. The
direct involvement of an audience was also seen as a check upon
the influence of spin doctors who in previous elections had been
deployed “to talk up their candidates’ performance and talk
down the achievements of the others” in order to skew post-de-
bate analysis. This time round the studio in which the leaders’
conducted their debate was declared a spin doctor-free zone in
the hope that the reactions of the studio audience rather than of
the party strategists would shape the media’s “instant” post-de-
bate analysis of the leaders’ performances (Globe and Mail, Sep-
tember 6, 1993).
Immediately after the debate the Newsworld CBC cable televi-
sion news network conducted a talk-back program, taking calls
and hearing views from across Canada. Indeed, throughout the
campaign Newsworld held regular phone-ins. For example, its
Sunday On the Line program assembled a panel of parliamentary
candidates representing various parties and invited viewers
across Canada to call collect where they had particular questions
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to put to the politicians. This same program prefaced commercial
breaks with brief “vox pop” segments compiled from grabs ob-
tained from questioning Canadians-in-the-street. Other televi-
sion programs also explored talk-back, even although
conventional wisdom holds that “talking (listening?) heads”
make poor TV. For instance CTV’s AM morning program con-
ducted periodic phone-ins to give its audience a voice in the
campaign coverage.
Television news and current affairs also pursued other inno-
vative strategies for involving voters. Thus the CBC’s network
news (as it routinely does) invited its audience to fax or phone
their comments on its news coverage and then included these in
a weekly “Your Turn” segment. And for the period of the elec-
tion the CBC’s 9 o’clock evening Prime Time News program in-
cluded a special segment which it dubbed “The Voters’ Voice”.
For these, specially selected audiences were assembled and
asked to evaluate particular campaign events (such as the lead-
ers’ debate, party advertising or even an election town hall
broadcast). The reactions of particular audience groups (such as
undecided voters, partisans, women, or unemployed Canadians)
were gauged using an on-screen graphing technique (in the fash-
ion of Nine’s “worm”). But these “Voters’ Voice” segments also
included small discussion groups modelled on the focus groups
that party strategists use to gauge the ebb and flow of public
opinion. This provided another opportunity for voters to com-
ment on the election on prime time national television.
Other news media chose different means of inviting ordinary
voters in. For example, the influential Toronto Sun newspaper
revisited an old idea and empanelled 18 uncommitted voters and
regularly obtained and reported their assessments of the unfold-
ing campaign. Other newspapers, such as the Vancouver Sun,
did likewise, tracking a panel of seven Vancouver voters during
the campaign. Canada’s national newspaper, the Globe and Mail,
assembled a “group of representative Canadian voters from
Winnipeg in the centre of the country” and for six weeks regu-
larly reported their reactions to the unfolding campaign. It also
ran a regular “vox populi” page in which it presented thumbnail
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sketches of the thoughts and opinions of Canadians-in-the-street
in different towns and regions. And in a similar vein it supple-
mented the findings of its various opinion polls with the more
detailed comments of selected respondents (because the “cool
statistics of a public-opinion poll” don’t always reflect the depth
of public feeling).
Pursuing a rather different inclusive strategy, the Vancouver
Sun and other newspapers in the Southam chain invited their
readers to write in with the questions they would like to ask the
party leaders. Southam reporters then asked those questions,
and each day published the leaders’ answers in an “Ask the
Leader” column. In yet another variation, Maclean’s magazine in
association with CTV invited 12 Canadians to a weekend in a ho-
tel and invited them to hammer out a mock budget (in an experi-
ment which demonstrated the difficulties of cutting back
government spending without damaging sectional interests). In
a number of instances radio followed the example of the press
and established panels of uncommitted or typical voters. For ex-
ample, the host of CBC radio’s Almanac afternoon show in British
Columbia regularly consulted a panel of undecided voters to ob-
tain their reactions to events such as the leaders’ debates. As
well, both CBC regional radio and commercial stations used
talk-back formats which provided their listeners with opportuni-
ties to comment on the election.
Keeping spin doctors at bay
Underlying the considerable efforts the various Canadian
news and current affairs media made to include the voices of Ca-
nadian voters in their 1993 election coverage was a determina-
tion not to be ensnared by the parties’ efforts to manage the news
(as the Tories had been able to in 1988). Prior to the campaign the
networks and major news organisations had even considered re-
fusing to assign reporters to accompany the leaders on the
“tours” which lie at the heart of each party’s calculations for con-
trolling news coverage of their campaigns. In the end they all re-
lented and did dispatch reporters to accompany the party
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leaders on their travels across Canada. However, most major
news organisations (as in previous elections) regularly rotated
reporters between the various leader’s tours. Most continued the
practice of “disdaining the news” — of publicising the parties’
efforts to manipulate the news. In some cases news organisations
made some quite surprising decisions intended to ensure that as-
pects of their campaign coverage retained a safe distance from
the parties’ spin doctors — for example by assigning individual
reporters to cover the election entirely from within the confines
of a single seat such as the Vancouver Central riding.
Several news organisations determined that they would
closely scrutinise the parties’ various policy claims and prom-
ises, perhaps inspired by the “ad watch” segments which US
television news had run during the 1992 presidential campaign
in an effort to hold candidates accountable for claims made in
their television advertising (see Pfau and Louden 1994, or Wicks
and Kern 1995). In this vein the Globe and Mail periodically in-
cluded an occasional “Reality Check” column in which it sought
to provide detailed background analysis to help readers assess
particular policy issues, and to a lesser extent to hold up state-
ments made by leaders against the record of their earlier pro-
nouncements. (The latter has been made a relative
straightforward task by the computerisation of newspapers,
which allows journalists to trawl through data bases constructed
from past issues.) CBC’s Prime Time News hour-long program in-
cluded an occasional, similar “Reality Watch” segment.
In an effort to shift the focus away from the national campaign
and the contrived activities of the leaders, many newspapers
provided a series of detailed surveys of the campaign and issues
of local concern in key ridings. Television followed suite. For ex-
ample, the CBC’s Prime Time News program also included an oc-
casional “Campaign Close-up” segment, which variously
examined the campaign in particular regions or even individual
ridings. It is true that as the 1993 election unfolded, both print
and broadcast news organisations were forced to pay particular
attention to Canada’s regions, since in the west the Reform Party,
and in Quebec, the Bloc Quebecois, rapidly emerged as major
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political forces and not the lesser players they had been assumed
to be at the beginning. Thus it was the rise of Reform and the
Bloc and not just a desire to stand aside from the national cam-
paign fought between the leaders which caused CBC to send re-
porters to different regions such as the Maritimes, Quebec and
Western Canada during the last weeks of the campaign. None-
theless, the result was a series of extended news reports which
provided a sketch of the very different regional campaigns being
fought — campaign close-up reports which augmented rather
than displaced coverage of the leaders and the national cam-
paign. CTV’s News Hour did likewise, dispatching reporters to
cover the campaign in Quebec and in the west when it became
apparent that the Bloc and Reform were looming as major politi-
cal forces in these regions.
It should be noted that most of the news coverage of the 1993
Canadian election campaign was a matter of business-as-usual.
The major parties went to unprecedented lengths to manage the
media coverage of their campaigns (Dornan 1994, p.83). For their
part, journalists and editors did not forego their fascination with
who was winning the “horse race”, nor their preoccupation with
what the leaders said and did. Neither did they pass up prof-
fered “photo-ops” and “sound bites”, and the opportunity to
seize upon slip-ups made by the leaders on the campaign trail. It
would be clearly wrong to suggest that coverage of the 1993 elec-
tion was fundamentally different from the leader-focused cover-
age of previous Canadian federal campaigns. Nonetheless, the
media did weave a new thread into the tapestry. Burnt by their
experience in 1988; provoked by the Royal Commission’s com-
ments on the inadequacy of news coverage of elections; and
aware of very high levels of public cynicism about politics; in
1993 the Canadian news media experimented with strategies
which might shift the focus of election news away from the lead-
ers, restrict the opportunities of the spin doctors to massage the
news, and instead give voters a greater voice. As the CBC execu-
tive producer responsible for the televised election debates, Ar-
nold Amber, said, with the innovative format allowing audience
members to question the leaders in mind, “It’s all part of a differ-
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ent way of looking at things, about who’s involved in public dis-
course” (Globe and Mail, September 6, 1993).
Obstacles to applying the Canadian model?
During the 1993 Canadian campaign many broadcast and
print journalists did seek to differently look at the question of
who should be involved in public discourse. Canadian media ex-
perimented with a variety of mechanisms for including the
voices of ordinary Canadians in their campaign coverage. Not all
these experiments proved entirely successful. But the innovative
approach taken in an effort to include the voice of ordinary Ca-
nadians in media coverage of the 1993 election campaign does
offer a model for Australian broadcasters and newsworkers.
However, I do not argue that the Australian media should un-
critically replicate the electronic town halls, voter panels, focus
groups and other methods devised by the Canadian media to in-
clude the voices of ordinary Canadians. To begin with, there are
sufficient differences between the Australian and Canadian po-
litical and media systems to suggest that some of these inclusive
practices might not readily be transplanted. Both Australia and
Canada have federal and Westminster-derived and thus similar
political systems. Even so there are significant differences.
Canadian politics are highly regional. Historically, important
regionally based politicians have long played a key role in elec-
tion campaigns. Hence Canadians are accustomed to, and the es-
tablished parties are happy for, politicians other than the leader
taking a leading role during an election campaign. Australian
political parties will be much more anxious to keep the focus on
their leader. Indeed, during the 1993 election Liberal frontbench-
ers were dispatched to their own constituencies lest they draw
attention away from Dr Hewson or advance arguments or claims
which might fuel media stories about divisions within the party.
Canadian parties have traditionally allowed lieutenants to speak
on behalf of party leaders. But in Australia parties which speak
with multiple voices during an election run the risk of being
painted as unable to govern their own house, let alone the coun-
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try. Here is a subtle difference in the political cultures of each
country which suggests that Canadian-style election town halls
might not easily be transplanted.
A further problem is that the Australian party system is essen-
tially bi-polar in that it pits the ALP against the Coalition parties.
In Canada in 1993 five separate parties were represented on the
panels of politicians which the CBC assembled for its election
town halls. However, in the Australian context Labor is certain
to decline to participate on a panel on which each Coalition party
is separately represented. And neither major party is likely to
agree to minor parties (such as the Democrats or Greens) appear-
ing as equals on a televised panel, because this might boost their
public standing. Again, the point is that the election town hall
which worked well enough in the context of the 1993 Canadian
election is unlikely to be easily transposed into an Australian
party environment which is essentially bi-polar and more
sharply adversarial. The general argument about the difficulty of
merely imitating Canadian practice can be extended. For exam-
ple, the two major Australian political parties run tighter, more
centrally controlled campaigns (Ward 1994). Hence they are
likely to be more skilled than their Canadian counterparts in
“stacking” the queues of callers to talk-back shows with their
own supporters. As a result, even where stations attempt to
screen out partisan callers, the talk-back format can provide an-
other forum for party warfare rather than a genuine opportunity
for ordinary Australians to inject their voices into the campaign.
Furthermore, the inclusive strategies developed or rediscov-
ered by the Canadian media to cover the 1993 campaign may not
all be readily transplanted because Australia has a different me-
dia system. For instance, (as yet) there is no Australian equiva-
lent of the CBC Newsworld cable channel and thus there are fewer
opportunities to experiment with innovative forms of election
coverage. The commercial free-to-air networks are highly un-
likely to willingly disrupt their regular program schedules to
carry an extended election coverage. Moreover, there is a
long-standing industry aversion to “talking heads” television.
This, together with the legacy of the Sydney radio talk-back host
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Alan Jones’ short-lived venture into current affairs television in
early 1994 fresh in mind, must mean that Australian television
producers will not be easily persuaded to incorporate an element
of talk-back into their election coverage (even although radio sta-
tions successfully use this format and it has been successfully
used by the CBC in Canada and the C-SPAN cable network in
the USA for some years.) Perhaps more to the point, there ap-
pears to be no widespread concern amongst editors and journal-
ists that the media coverage of Australian federal elections does
have shortcomings. Critics tend to be academics standing out-
side of the news media, and there is no professional or other fo-
rum (such as the Queen’s University seminars) to bring
newsworkers and their critics together and to provide journalists
with an opportunity to collectively consider how else they might
report on election campaigns.
Some flaws in the glass?
The practical obstacles to imitating innovative Canadian prac-
tices to one side, there is the separate, broader question of
whether televised town halls and the like actually do usefully in-
volve voters in public discourse. Clearly the Canadian propo-
nents of these more inclusive strategies are enthusiastic about
their potential. Amber, for one, believes that this different way of
looking at elections has its foot firmly in the door: “All we do
from now on is ask ourselves how to do it better” (Globe and Mail,
October 9, 1993). But equally there are also Canadian journalists
and media critics who have reservations. For instance, some
have pointed to the ad hoc and ultimately unrepresentative man-
ner in which media outlets assembled panels of ordinary Cana-
dians. Even where market research firms painstakingly gathered
together representative audiences for the CBC town halls it is
likely that some Canadians — for example the aged, disabled
and those not fluent in English or French — will not have been
included. More ad hoc methods of selecting talk-back callers or
typical voters are even more likely to leave systematic gaps. In
the end this reservation amounts to a quibble about the failure to
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use the tools of social science to include the voices of a statisti-
cally representative sample of voters. Other critics have raised
more substantive questions about the media’s capacity to, and
the very merit of giving citizens a voice in the coverage of elec-
tions. One line of argument suggests that the involvement of or-
dinary Canadians in the 1993 campaign discourse was largely
illusory. A second challenges the wisdom of giving voters an un-
fettered or un-mediated voice in public discourse.
After the 1993 election various Canadian newsworkers, party
strategists and spin doctors, and invited media scholars assem-
bled (as the Lortie Royal Commission had suggested they
should) for the Queen’s Forum on Media and Politics to evaluate
the media coverage of the campaign. This forum was subse-
quently televised as a series of one-hour programs on CBC’s
Newsworld cable channel. One issue debated by participants was
whether the various methods which the media had devised to in-
clude voters in the campaign coverage merely provided a facade
of public participation, or, indeed, had actually enabled the gen-
uine involvement of ordinary Canadians. It is true, as R.M. Lee
suggests, that issues such as “gay rights, agriculture, and fisher-
ies” received a hearing where they may otherwise not have (Lee
1993, A7). Yet it is equally true that many of devices used to in-
volve voters allowed journalists and editors a considerable edi-
torial discretion. For example, the format of “vox pop” clips and
columns required careful editing. Equally, a degree of editorial
control must necessarily have been exercised over the publica-
tion of selected comments made by the voters on the various
panels of ordinary Canadians whom the media consulted. Edi-
tors clearly retained some discretion in selecting which of the
questions that Southam reporters asked party leaders on behalf
of their readers would be included. Even talk-back callers could
be screened, and on air, challenged on the accuracy of their
claims. In short, the voice of ordinary Canadians in the public
discourse surrounding the 1993 election campaign was inevita-
bly mediated.
Of course, it might be argued that where the news media in-
vites public participation journalists have a particular responsi-
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bility to mediate — to act as gate keepers and guardians of the
veracity of the views and claims that are broadcast or published.
This is not always easily done, especially where live-to-air
broadcasting is involved. Simply put, one of the problems of in-
viting voters back into the campaign discourse is that they may
sometimes prove unwelcome guests. Witness the difficulty
which the female host of the Newsworld talk-back segment imme-
diately following the English language leaders’ debate had in
maintaining her equanimity when a caller declared that he
would be forced to choose between Reform and the Liberals
since as a Christian he could not vote either for the NDP nor for
the Conservatives (both lead by women) because the Bible
taught that women should not be raised above men!
Of all the means of involving voters, it was the series of CBC
election town halls and the segment of the leaders’ television de-
bates in which the audience asked questions which gave (some
carefully selected) ordinary Canadians freest reign to speak out.
And at the post-election Queen’s Forum a lively discussion en-
sued when it was suggested that the televised town halls were
“fatally flawed” because the media had surrendered its
gatekeeping role. Its critics charged that the town hall format
had allowed audience members to make statements which went
unchallenged in the way that journalists would routinely exam-
ine and critically test claims made by politicians. Political com-
mentator and election watcher Ron Graham suggested that it
was insulting to presume that the voters involved could not
withstand interrogation. He argued that by allowing people to
freely vent their frustration with the political process without
making some defence of the system, the election town halls had
damaged rather than extended Canada’s democracy. On the
other hand, Prime Time‘s co-host, Peter Mansbridge, ventured
the opinion that it was the job of the politicians and not the jour-
nalists involved to challenge town hall audience members who
made outrageous claims. He said that the CBC had conceived of
the town halls as a two-way street and when it had become ap-
parent that the traffic was flowing in just one direction, had en-
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couraged panel members to challenge inaccurate statements and
claims made by audience members. In practice none did.
Like the journalists, those politicians involved in the elec-
tion town halls were reluctant to bark at the public on national
television. Instead, by and large, they sought to give the same
kinds of measured answer that they might give to questions
posed by journalists at a media conference. Often their an-
swers failed to please audience members (who did not have
the same purpose as journalists in asking questions and cer-
tainly not the same political knowledge). In a sense the politi-
cians appearing were slow to learn the new rules of
engagement which applied in these televised town hall en-
counters. Not so some of the invited audience. While politi-
cians may have felt constrained by their wider TV audience
and unable to rebuke questioners who asked ill-informed or
simplistic questions, some participating audience members
seized the opportunity to ride their hobby horse in public. The
CBC town hall format included a closing segment when the in-
vited audience was asked to comment generally on the re-
sponses of the panel of politicians to questions they had been
asked. By the later election town halls in the weekly series, the
invited audience members had learnt that this was their op-
portunity to make their own editorial statements live on na-
tional television. A number made impassioned statements on
their pet cause without any regard to the topic ostensibly un-
der debate. Typically these concluding discussions ended on a
downbeat note, with a succession of speakers asserting that
politicians of all kinds were out of touch with ordinary Cana-
dians.
Lessons for the Australian news media?
At the end of an election in which the Canadian news media
made unprecedented efforts to involve voters, whether the
media can — and whether they ought — give unfettered ac-
cess to the voices of ordinary Canadians remain unresolved
questions. Nonetheless, the various inclusive strategies
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adopted by the media to put ordinary Canadians back in the
picture clearly added a dimension to news coverage of the
1993 Canadian federal election which was entirely missing
from coverage of the Australian campaign. Herein there is a
lesson for those Australian journalists and editors who are re-
sponsible for deciding how election campaigns should be re-
ported. It is not that the Australian news media should imitate
the electronic town halls, voter panels, talk-back television, fo-
cus groups and other methods devised by the Canadian media
to include the voices of ordinary Canadians.
Some of these methods may well be worth experimenting
with. Some — most obviously talk-back radio, vox pop inter-
views and the creation of panels of typical voters — have cer-
tainly been experimented with in the past (although not
necessarily with a determination to build voters back into elec-
tion coverage). But Australia has a different political environ-
ment into which it may not be possible to simply transplant
inclusive mechanisms, even where these are judged to have
worked well enough in a Canadian context. However, the chief
lesson for Australian journalists and editors is that there is a “dif-
ferent way of looking at things”. It is indeed possible to conceive
of alternative journalistic practices, and of ways of reporting
elections which might include the voices of voters as well as
those of the politicians, sectional interests and the expert com-
mentators who have come to dominate public discourse in Aus-
tralia.
Yet, sadly, while Canadian practice demonstrates that there
are alternative, more inclusive ways of defining public discourse
and of reporting election campaigns, this is a lesson which Aus-
tralian journalists and editors are unlikely to heed. It is true that
some Australian news workers are aware of recent north Ameri-
can trends in political reporting. In the latter 1980s and early
1990s Australian print media journalists did experiment with
disdaining the news. The result was a smattering of stories in se-
rious newspapers such as the Age and Australian about party
pollsters, strategists and advertising agencies and their be-
hind-the-scenes role in election campaigns. More recently some
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news outlets have begun to experiment with their own “reality
checks”. For instance, the Australian’s coverage of the 1995 New
South Wales election incorporated an occasional column by Tom
Dusevic entitled “Fact or Fiction?” in which the veracity of
claims made by the competing parties was scrutinised. Such ini-
tiatives are to be welcomed. But these are more a sign that Aus-
tralian journalists are moved by the fads and fashions of north
American newswork. There is no determination among Austra-
lian journalists to adjust their news-gathering and reporting
strategies as has begun to emerge in Canada (and also in the
USA [see Wicks and Kern 1995, p.238]) as the result of debate
among newsworkers concerned by the political manipulation of
election news processes.
There is very little evidence that those who report Australian
politics are troubled by the nature of the news and current affairs
coverage which federal elections receive. It is only academic
commentators (like Sless, or Bell and Boehringer) who complain
that the Australian news media cover elections in the same, tired
old way. Judging by the public record, editors and journalists ap-
pear to share no similar sentiment. Complacency rules and
Nine’s “worm” counts as innovation! There is no widespread
mood of disillusionment among political reporters of the kind
stirred within the Canadian media by the highly manipulative
1988 Tory campaign. Moreover, there has been no Australian
equivalent of the Lortie Commission to chide the Australian me-
dia for their election coverage, and to challenge them to find in-
novative and more inclusive ways of reporting campaigns. It
may be pessimistic, but perhaps the real lesson to be taken from
Canada is that the preconditions for change are not present, and
that there is little immediate prospect of the Australian news and
current affairs media enthusiastically adopting more inclusive
ways of covering elections in this country.
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